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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the Aqreement between the parties a contract for sale or an 
option. 
2. Should the forfeiture of those amounts paid by Plaintiffs under the 
agreement be deemed unconscionable. 
3. Is Summary Judgment appropriate. 
STATEMENT Qg ^ gASE 
N?ffBlffi--^^THB^eftSB^ 
The matter deals with the termination of a contract for the purchase of 
real property. Plaintif f/Buyers contend the contract was in the nature of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract whose termination resulted in an unconscionable 
forfeiture. Defendant/Sellers contend the contract was in the nature of an 
Option that expired under its own termsf and that any amounts paid by 
Plaintiffs were consideration for option periods. 
COURSE .OF iHPGBEKMBS AND DISPOSITION M «mdER COURT T 
Plaintiffs brought suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and 
for Utah County by Complaint dated September 30, 1983. Defendants filed an 
Answer on October 7f 1983. 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 14, 1986
 f to 
which Defendants responded and filed their own Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Both parties based their request for summary relief along those theories 
advanced in their Complaint and Answer. 
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On October 29, 1986, the Honorable Ray Harding, Judge, entered a ruling 
denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendants1 
holding that "it is the opinion of the Court that the agreement is an 
option," and citing briefly his reasons for so holding (R. 64-5). On November 
7, 1986, Judqe Harding signed a Summary Judgment (R. 89-90). 
STATEMENT OF -FACT« 
On or about October 22, 1982, Plaintiffs as "Buyers" and Defendants as 
"Sellers" entered into an agreement to arrange the transfer of real property 
in Utah County, State of Utah. (Characterizations as "Buyers" and "Sellers" 
refer to the language of the document itself, See e.g. A 1, R-78). The 
document in question was titled "Option", although it refers throughout to 
terms such as "Buyer" and "Seller" rather than "Optionee", etc. In addition, 
the document refers to Plaintiffs as "joint tenants". In the second numbered 
paragraph the document refers to "total purchase price" and "down payment", 
provides that the sums paid shall be applied to the purchase price, and 
provides for interest (R-78). 
The third numbered paragraph of the document provides for "extensions" 
of the period of the "Option" for short periods of time by the tendering of 
substantial payments (R-78). Plaintiffs did make substantial payments toward 
the total purchase price of One Hundred and Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars 
($195,000.00) (R-78), by paying Ei#ity-Six Thousand Dollars ($86,000.00) to 
Defendants between October 22, 1980 and February 2, 1983. (Answers to 
Interroqatories R-32-3). Plaintiffs made an additional payment to Defendants 
of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) (R-33), for a total paid to Defendants 
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of Eighty-Nine Thousand Dollars ($89,000.00) . Despi te the f a c t t h a t 
Plaintiffs never received any use or benefit frcra the property ( i t continued 
to be used as the residence of Defendants1 family (R-36), and despi te the 
fact of substantial paymentsf Defendants allege Plaintiffs have no equity in 
the property. 
P l a i n t i f f s were not i f ied of the termination and expira t ion of the 
"Option" by le t te r dated December l f 1982, from Defendants' a t torney. The 
same le t t e r informed Plaintiffs of the decision of Defendants to r e t a in a l l 
of the $89,000.00 paid to them. (R-85-6) 
Further provision of the document signed by the p a r t i e s provided t h a t 
evidence of t i t l e was to be provided to Se l l e r s ( f i f th numbered paragraph, 
R-79)
 f and provided for the payment of a commission to those p a r t i e s the 
Selles recognized as broker and l i s t ing agent. (Eighth numbered paragraph; 
R-80). In fact, a commission was paid (R-56). 
The Option was not signed by e i ther P la in t i f f f (R-80), although an 
Escrow Aqreement refer ing to the Option was s igned by one of the two 
Plaintiffs (R-82-3). Despite the c lear language of the Option and Escrow 
Aqreement that both Plaintiffs were "Buyers" and/or "Grantees", the escrowed 
deed named only one Plaintiff as grantee (R-81). 
Defendants ignored the requirements of Paragraph 5 of the agreement t o 
provide evidence of t i t l e of clear t i t l e (R-79, and Affidavit of I l a Spat ig, 
R-67-8). 
Defendants are now in possession of said land and P l a i n t i f f s have not 
recovered any sums paid. 
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SUHHflRY ^ A R GUMENT -
The aqreement entered into between the parties is a contract for the 
sale of real property. Regardless of the title the parties affixed thereto, 
caselaw supports that the Courts will look to the underlying intent of the 
parties and the realities of the situation in determining the nature of the 
aqreement. 
As a contract for salef Utah caselaw holds that the forfeiture of 
$89/000.00, with no offset for use or waste, is unconscionable. Plaintiffs 
should therefore be awarded damages in the amount of the sums paid by them, 
plus interest, as sought in their motion. 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is inappropriate and wrong as a 
matter of law. 
ARGUMENT -
It is well settled that the nature of obligations imposed upon parties 
will control over the name given to an agreement by the parties. Courts will 
construe ambiguous contracts, as those of sale rather than of option under 
appropriate circumstances, and will consider favorably facts that tend to 
indicate contemplation of future contracts over a binding of option: 
Although it is said that use of the word "option" in a 
contract excludes the idea of an absolute agreement to 
purchaser it is generally held that the nature of a 
contract as an option or obligation to purchase is to 
be determined not by the name which the parties have 
given it, but by the nature of the obligations which 
it imposes, and a contract has been held to be a 
contract of sale even where it is styled by the parties 
themselves an "option." 
77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Section 27, p. 204. 
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Plaintiffs urqe upon this Court that those facts exist in the instant case. 
The determination of the agreement as a contract rather than an option 
is supported by sister jurisdictions as well as those of Utah. As the 
Colorado Supreme Court stated in DeFeyterm« vRiiey«- 606 P.2d 453 (Co. 1979): 
The fact that the word "option" appears in the title of 
the instrument does not mandate a determination that 
the instrument is an option contract. See Morah v. 
Perkins, 86 Colo. 101, 278 P. 611 (1929). The import 
of that word is negated by other words used in the 
document, including: "Purchaser", "seller", "earnest 
money and part payment", and "purchaser agees to buy." 
Such terms are indications of the parties1 mutual 
obligation to sell and purchase. See Cullen v. Park 
CLub Land Co., 67 Colo. 210, 184 P. 303 (1919). 
Althouqh in DeFevteg the Court found the contract in question to be 
specifically enforceable by the purchaser, the Court did expressly consider 
the use of language by the parties to negate the title "Option". The 
DeEeyter language is similar to that found in the disputed agreement, and 
it is appropriate to determine mutual obligations to sell and purchase. 
It is important to note that the return promise to buy can be implied 
as well as expressed: 
Problems of Interpretation Respecting Options 
There are many cases in which an offer to buy or sell 
on stated terms has been made and it cannot readily be 
determined whether or not the other party has made, 
either expressly or by implication, a return premise to 
sell or buy. The problem is almost wholly one of 
interpretation. In this process, for the purpose of 
determining whether a repudiating party has actually 
made a promise, testimony of all the surrounding 
circumstances and negotiations is admissable and 
necessary. 
Corbin on Contracts, Section 274, p. 603 
That same section later goes on to provide: 
The fact that the parties call their contract an 
"option contract" does not make it one. The legal 
relations created by their agreement must be determined 
by reasonable interpretation of all the provisions that 
it contains* Id- at 611. 
See also Section 261 A, Corbin on Contractsf p. 483, discussing interpretation 
of terms in general. 
The power of this Court to consider whether the true nature of an 
agreement despite the title has been established in Baker ^ -rTaggart , 628 , 
P.2d 1283. (Utah 1981). The Court stated: 
Whether a transaction is a sale, or a loan disguised as 
a sale, is a question controlled by the intention of 
the parties as it existed at the time of the execution 
and delivery of the instruments. 
The intentions of the parties, at the time of execution is a question such 
that Summary Judgment is precluded. 
The Baker Court went further in establishing elements to be 
considered in determining hew to construe a document. (In that case, deed 
absolute as opposed to mortgage). 
In determining whether a deed, absolute in i t s terms, 
i s intended as a mortgage, some of the e s s e n t i a l 
e lements t o be cons ide red as l a i d down by t h e 
authorities are: Whether or not there was a continuing 
obligation on the part of the granto to pay the debt or 
meet the obligation which i t i s claimed the deed was 
made to secure; the question of r e l a t i v e va lues ; the 
contemporaneous and subsequent a c t s ; the dec lara t ions 
and admissions of the par t ies ; the form of the wr i t t en 
ev idences of the t r a n s a c t i o n s ; the n a t u r e and 
character of the testimony r e l i ed upon; the various 
business, social, or other relationship of the part ies; 
and the apparent aims and purposes to be accomplished. 
550 P.2d a t 188-89. 
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Id a t 1284, citing Hansen ^ .Kohler* Utah, 550 P.2d 186 (1976). 
As in those cases, issues as to r e l a t i v e va lues , contemporaneous and 
subsequent acts , form of the written evidence, e t c . , exis t here . P l a i n t i f f s 
submit that the Court belcw erred in interpreting those issues against them, 
or in not finding quest ions of fac t such t h a t summary d i s p o s i t i o n i s 
inaroropriate. 
There i s a specific case in Utah where t h i s Court found the power to 
interpret an agreement as an option or a contract a f te r inves t iga t ing the 
elements thereof. See Roberts, ^ ^Biraffert« 33 Utah 5 1 , 92 P.789 (1907). 
In the case of Cole v„ Haynes^ 62 S02d 779 (Mississippi 1953), the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi considered a s i tuat ion similar to the present* 
In CoIe» the parties executed an "Option Contract and Agreement." The terms 
specified a purchase pr ice and time to perform. As in the present case, 
clear t i t l e was to be provided Buyer paid an amount down. When Se l le r was 
unable to clear t i t l e , the Court read through the t i t l e of the Agreement t o 
hold: 
We are sa t i s f ied t ha t t h i s instrument evidences the 
intent of the parties to create an executory contract 
bindinq on both parties for the sale of land; and tha t 
under i t s terms if appellee was unable t o make a good 
t i t l e on February L 1952, the contract was thereby 
rescinded and appellee was o b l i g a t e d t o repay t o 
appellant the down payment made by appellant. Appellee 
was unable to make good t i t l e , so under Lhis contract 
he i s obligated to repay appellant. Whether the nature 
of a contract i s an option or a bi la teral obligation to 
purchase i s to be determined not by the name which the 
p a r t i e s have given i t , but by the na tu re of the 
obligations which i t imposes. Where i t appears t h a t 
the general intention of the parties was to consummate 
a s a l e , tha t in tent ion should be effectuated. The 
entire present instrument ind ica tes tha t the p a r t i e s 
thouqht that th i s was a contract to purchase and s e l l , 
creating mutual obligations on both p a r t i e s . 55 Am. 
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Jur . f Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 27-30; Annotation 
3 A.L.R. 576; Annotation 87 A.L.R. 563 . 
The language of the Court that i t i s the intent of the p a r t i e s t ha t controls 
i s of particular interest . 
The ci te in the above case to 87 A.L.R. 563, Land Contracts - Option or 
Purchaser contains many ci tes to cases in which various courts sweep aside 
lanquaqe to consider intent and fair resul t s . See Q*g«« Wolfe <v«, Daughtery 
103 FLA 432, 137 So 717, annotated a t 571. In that matter, the Florida Court 
held a contract termed "option" to be a contract of sa le a f te r considering 
that payment made would be applied to purchase price, and f uther considering 
requirements of providing clear t i t l e . 
I t should be noted that as in Daughtery, the funds paid by P l a i n t i f f s 
to Defendants was eventually to be applied to purchase pr ice and was not 
considered merely consideration to keep an option period open. 
Having made the determination that the agreement between the p a r t i e s i s 
a contract of sale and not a mere option, th is Court should next consider the 
provisions of that contract. Those provisions requir ing P l a i n t i f f s t o make 
huge payments within short time frames or lose t h e i r e n t i r e i n t e r e s t in the 
heme amount to a forfeiture clause t ha t i s unconscionable, insofar as the 
penalty actually assessed aqainst the Plaintiffs i s grossly disproport ionate 
to any loss suffered by Defendants. Plaint iffs have l o s t ont only whetever 
equity they may have ever had in t h e home, but $89,000.00 as w e l l . 
In discussing the enforcement of the liquidated damages provisions of a 
real estate contract, the Utah Supreme Court in Soffe v* Ridd- 659 P.2d 
1082 (Utah 1983) stated: 
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A liquidated damages provision of a contract w i l l not 
be enforced unless those damages bear some reasonable 
relationship to actual damagesf or as i t i s sometimes 
s ta ted , the l iquida ted damages must not be grossly 
excessive as to shock the conscience of t h i s cour t . 
Johnson v. Carman, Utah, 572 P2d 371 (1977); Jacobsen 
v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954); Perkins v . 
Spencer, 212 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). Courts 
<to-nofc 4qnocg -contaagfrs -nog -lightly-infrgrfsss yifeh-
thenu v *Qnlv--in^extreme -circumstances^where . forfe i ture 
would fr? corcplstgly msreason^lfr an<3 >ttngQnsgiQnab3ie -
doe&fthis^ule ^against liquidated damages .apply ^ « . . 
(Emphasis Added) 
Plaintiffs submit that the forfeiture of t he i r payments to Defendants 
fa l l s within the above parameters or a t the very l e a s t the factual dispute 
over the reasonableness thereof precludes summary judgment. 
For the above reasons t h i s Court should r e v e r s e t he d e n i a l of 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting of Defendants1 s imilar 
motion. Judgment should be entered for P la in t i f f s against Defendants in an 
amount equal to the sums paid, plus interest and a l ien placed on the subject 
property in that amount* In the alternative, this matter should be remanded 
to District Court for t r i a l* 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th is 27th day of February, 1987. 
WILLIAM L. SOJUL z^l 
Attorney for Plaihxiffs/Appellants 
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MMLINS CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Brief of Appellants was mailed postage prepaid this 27th day of 
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Robert L* Mood/ 
TAYLOR. MDODy & 1H0RNE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
******************* 
MAX SPATIG & ILA JEAN SPATIG, 
Plaintiff, 
~vs-
TOM L. ALVEY, et al., 
Defendant. 
C/JSE NUMBER 6 4 , 9 0 3 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
RULING 
The above-captioned matter having been submitted in 
accordance with Rule 2.8 of the Rulete of Practice of the 
District Courts and the Court having considered the matter now 
makes the following ruling: 
Plaintiff's motion for summary Judgment is denied. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
There are no genuine issues as to any material fact and 
the defendant is entitled to judgment as k matter of law. 
The parties acknowledge the existence and execution of 
the agreement which is the subject of this case. The issue is 
one of law; i.e., is the contract betweeh the parties an option 
or a real estate contract. It is the opinion of the Court that 
the agreement is an option. 
The plaintiff had no obligation to complete the 
purchase; which would make the agreement a real estate contract. 
The provisions for continued extensions of the right of the 
plaintiff to exercise the option to purchase upon payment of 
specified sums does not change the nature of the agreement 
between the parties. 
At any time the plaintiff vjas at liberty to: (1) 
Exercise the option by paying the purchase price (less credit for 
option payments); (2) Extend the option period by making an 
additional payment (until all option extensions were exercised); 
or (3) "Drop" the option (in which event plaintiff would forfeit 
all option money paid and have no further obligations to the 
defendant). 
Dated this 29th day of October 
cc: William L. Schultz, Esq. 
Robert L. Moody, Esq, 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
W . l H JU3ioh.1ii?pir r r ow 
Of- UTAH COUSJV.STAVf OF UTAH 
IS8S NOV ^ PH |: 2 0 
WILLIAM ft.MUiSH.Ct.fRK 
...f-'iPUTY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU,RT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX SPATIG & ILA JEAN SPATIG, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




Casj? Number 64,903 
RayjM. Harding, Judge 
Plaintiff having made a Motion foj: Summary Judgment and 
Defendant having made a Counter Motion for Summary Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 2.8 Rules of Practice in 'the District Court and 
the Court having fully considered the Motion and Counter Motion 
together with the accompanying Memorandums of Points and 
Authorities and having entered its Ruling dated the 29th day of 
October, 1986 and being fully advised in the premises, 
'^ Ok HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion for Summarjy Judgment i s hereby 
denied. 
1 
2. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
granted and Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed with 
prej udice. 
3. It is hereby decreed that |:he Plaintiffs have no 
right, title or interest in the foil owing described real 
property: 
B e g i n n i n g W e s t 8 2 7 . 8 4 f e ^ 
N o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 12 
Sou th , Range 2 E a s t , S a l t La 
M e r i d i a n - t h e n c e South 429.61 
Nor th 8 8 d 5 0 ' West 321.81 f e e t ; 
0° 15' Eas t 423.06 f e e t ; thend 
f e e t ; t h e n c e Nor th 244.20 f e e t ; 
331.78 f e e t ; thence South 244.2G 
po in t of beginning. S i t ua t ed I 
and 12, Township 9 South, Range 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
DATED t h i s / day of November, 1! 
t f rom t h e 
, Township 9 
ke Base and 
f e e t ; t h e n c e 
t h e n c e Nor th 
e West 1 1 .88 
t h e n c e E a s t 
) f ee t to the 
in Sec t ions 1 
2 East , S a l t 
'86. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN 
Mailed a copy of the 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 1200 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, 




t|o William L. Shultz, 
lubBuilding, 136 East 
postage prepaid, this 
